In this study, we examine the association between analyst earnings forecast error and a refined measure of institutional ownership for different groups of institutional investors: transient, dedicated, and quasi-indexers. We hypothesize that transient investors will have higher investment in companies with more accurate earnings forecasts (lower forecast error) because they perceive forecast accuracy as the signal of decreased price impact of trades and increased profit trading opportunities. We also have speculated that dedicated investors will have lower investment in companies with more accurate earnings forecasts (lower forecast error) because of their concerns about lost information advantage and potential overpricing. We have assumed that the accuracy of earnings forecasts is not relevant for the investment decisions of quasi-indexers. Therefore, we haven't expected to find any association between analyst earnings forecast error and extent of ownership by quasi-indexers in those companies.
Institutional investor preferences for analyst forecast accuracy:
does investment strategy matter?
Abstract.
In this study, we examine the association between analyst earnings forecast error and a refined measure of institutional ownership for different groups of institutional investors: transient, dedicated, and quasi-indexers. We hypothesize that transient investors will have higher investment in companies with more accurate earnings forecasts (lower forecast error) because they perceive forecast accuracy as the signal of decreased price impact of trades and increased profit trading opportunities. We also have speculated that dedicated investors will have lower investment in companies with more accurate earnings forecasts (lower forecast error) because of their concerns about lost information advantage and potential overpricing. We have assumed that the accuracy of earnings forecasts is not relevant for the investment decisions of quasi-indexers. Therefore, we haven't expected to find any association between analyst earnings forecast error and extent of ownership by quasi-indexers in those companies.
Empirical evidence suggests that transient investors are indeed drawn to companies with lower forecast errors and increase (decrease) their holdings when the forecast error decreases (increases). However, the evidence on the behavior of dedicated investors and quasi-indexers reveals more complex decision pattern. Overall, controlling for endogeneity, forecast error does not impact levels of ownership by quasi-indexers or dedicated investors. At the same time, our changes analyses suggest that quasi-indexers decrease their holdings in response to forecast error declines while dedicated investors increase their holdings in response to forecast error increases. We also document differences in preferences of different types of institutional investors toward other basic corporate characteristics such as company size, leverage, and stock turnover.
These findings should be of relevance for financial analysts and for researchers examining earnings management/earnings forecast accuracy. They highlight the importance to adjust for investors' heterogeneity in research models rather than to cast institutional investors as a homogeneous group. Our findings indicate that, whether they are aware of it or not, in their attempts to achieve "predictable earnings" both management and analysts appeal mainly to one type of institutional investors: transient.
I. INTRODUCTION.
In this paper, we consider whether the market response to properties of analyst earnings forecasts differs by market participant type. Specifically, we examine whether different investment horizons of institutional investors lead to disparities in their attention to earnings forecast accuracy. While prior earnings management research has concluded that the market pays close attention to analyst earnings forecasts by rewarding (punishing) firms for meeting (missing) these benchmarks, which particular types of market participants are responsible for this market reaction remains unclear. Are all investors equally interested in analysts' forecasts? Do all investors pay similar attention to forecasting accuracy in their investment decisions?
These issues warrant further exploration. The extensive accounting literature on earnings management stipulates that management "manages earnings" in response to investors' expectations (e.g., Graham et al., 2005) . However, if not all investors are equally interested in forecast accuracy, then our understanding of the mechanism of market reactions and management's related motivation is incomplete. Failure to fully understand those might result in erroneous conclusions about mandatory disclosures and corporate governance issues, and may have other negative policy implications.
In our study, we address some of those concerns. We focus on the behavior of one specific group of investors, that of institutional investors. Considered as a group, institutional investors constitute more than 50% of US aggregate corporate ownership (Smith 1996) and are responsible for about two-thirds of daily stock trading (Hutchins 1994) . Prior research has documented both the prominent role of this group in corporate governance (Koh, 2007) and its significant impact on the information environment (e.g., D'Souza et al., 2007; Wang and Zhang, 2009 ). Prior studies have also highlighted the importance of considering the differences in investment horizons of institutional investors in various decision domains (e.g., Bushee, 1998; 2001; Koh, 2007; Wang and Zhang 2009) .
We contribute to this research stream, as we report the asymmetric impact of forecast accuracy on investment decisions across the different types of institutional investors. Consistent with prior findings, we document that transient investors are indeed drawn to companies with lower forecast errors, and that they increase (decrease) their holdings when forecast errors decrease (increase). However, the evidence about the behavior of dedicated investors and quasiindexers reveals more complex decision pattern. After controlling for endogeneity, there is no evidence that analyst forecast error impacts the levels of dedicated ownership and quasi-indexers.
At the same time, our changes analyses suggest that quasi-indexers decrease their holdings in response to forecast accuracy improvement while dedicated investors increase their holdings in response to both forecast accuracy declines and forecast accuracy improvement. We also document differences in preferences of different types of institutional investors toward other basic corporate characteristics such as company size, leverage, and analyst following.
Our findings are important for several reasons. First, we demonstrate that only transient investors are attracted to the companies with lower forecast errors and are the likely source of the previously documented positive market responses to forecast accuracy. The behavior of quasiindexers (dedicated investors), who decrease (increase) their holdings in response to forecast accuracy improvements (declines), suggests that dedicated investors and quasi-indexers recognize transient investors' obsession with forecast accuracy and perceive changes in forecast accuracy as arbitrage opportunities. Thus, our second contribution is the empirical evidence supporting the validity of the "investor sentiment" argument and the existence of "contrarian investment" (e.g., Lakonishok et al., 1994) : market participants seem to recognize market mispricing due to "naïve" behavior of other market participants and adjust their own investments accordingly. At the same time, the reaction of dedicated investors and quasi-indexers is asymmetric: quasi-investors sell in response to accuracy improvements while dedicated investors buy in response to both accuracy declines and improvement. This response asymmetry is likely due to evaluation processes of portfolio managers of quasi-indexers and associated "windowdressing," which includes failure to invest in companies who underperform in the short-run (e.g., Lakonishok et al., 1991) . Due to dominance of quasi-investors among institutional investors, such behavior explains asymmetry in market reactions in beating versus missing earnings benchmarks and provides our third contribution, evidence in the argument on the limits of arbitrage and in understanding sources of "noise trading" (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) .
Overall, our results confirm the validity of prior calls to adjust for investors' heterogeneity in both research models and managerial decisions, rather than to cast institutional investors as a homogeneous group (e.g, Koh, 2007; Wang and Zhang, 2009 ). We draw attention to the fact that corporate executives might be unaware that their self-admitted focus on earnings predictability at the expense of long-term value (Graham et al., 2005) caters to the interest of only the limited group of the institutional investors and might contribute to stock volatility. Our study also provides useful insights for members of corporate Audit Committees, who should be aware that the dominance of transient investors increases executives' motivation for managing earnings, and for external auditors who might consider "investor base" as an additional factor in their risk assessment models.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section of this paper, we provide a review of the prior literature and develop our hypotheses. In section 3, we identify data sources and describe our sample. We then explain our model and present results of our level analyses (section 4), changes analysis (section 5), and simultaneous equations modeling (section 6). We conclude with a discussion of implications and limitations of our study results.
II. PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES.

Our contribution to prior research.
Prior studies about motivations for earnings management have examined the market reaction to whether firms meet or miss analyst earnings forecasts and concluded that the market rewards (punishes) firms for meeting (missing) these benchmarks. Annual abnormal returns are higher for companies that consistently meet earnings targets (Kasznik and McNichols, 2002) .
Further, market penalties for missing forecasts are greater than the rewards for beating forecasts (Lopez and Rees, 2002) . Finally, meeting analysts' expectations recently became the most critical earnings threshold for corporate management (Brown and Caylor, 2005) .
Researchers provide competing explanations for these phenomena. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) employ prospect theory and argue for an irrational asymmetric response to bad versus good news. Instead, Kasznik and McNichols (2002) explain this anomaly from the efficient market perspective. They suggest that the market perceives meeting or missing a benchmark as a signal of the direction of future earnings, and that meeting a benchmark consistently is an indicator of reduced investment risk.
We contribute to this emerging literature by examining how institutional investors, as a group, view the signal of earnings forecast accuracy and whether different types of institutional investors differ in their investment reactions to this signal. Our study complements prior accounting research about earnings management in several important ways. First, while prior studies modeled beating/missing forecasts as a dichotomous variable, we address investors' reaction to the more complex signal of overall earnings forecast accuracy. Second, our study is an association study, not an event study, and our focus is on the relatively long-term impact, that of one year and beyond, rather than immediate impact of forecasting accuracy. Third, we do not assume the homogeneity of investors' decision algorithms, unlike prior studies. Instead, we accept investors' heterogeneity and speculate about the divergence of their investment strategies and the presence of "contrarian investment" (e.g., Lakonishok et al. 1994) . Therefore, we do not examine either three days or annual marketadjusted returns. Instead, the focus of our inquiry is on levels of and changes in institutional ownership as a whole and by different types of institutional investors. We speculate that the reported anomaly of asymmetric market reactions to beating versus missing earnings forecasts is due to a rational response of investors with heterogeneous investment horizons in conditions of limited arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) .
Research about the impact of investors' heterogeneity on corporate environments builds on the methodology of Bushee (1998) , which assigns institutional investors to one of three empirically distinct clusters based on their trading patterns: transient investors, quasi-indexers, and dedicated investors. We employ this methodology and examine whether different investment horizons of institutional investors lead to disparities in their attention to the accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts. We predict and document significant differences in the sensitivity of institutional investors to earnings forecast accuracy. Thus, contrary to some prior studies (e.g., Frankel et al., 2006; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007; Ajinkya et al. 2005; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) , our research does not explore the impact of the presence of institutional ownership on corporate governance and information asymmetry. Instead, we complement findings of prior studies on determinants of institutional ownership (e.g., O'Brien and Bhushan 1990; Bushee and Noe 2000) in documenting the factors leading to high institutional ownership in the first place.
Hypotheses development.
The accuracy of analyst forecasts is a complex signal that reflects the degree of transparency in the corporate information environment and captures a variety of underlying factors, such as analyst following and corporate disclosure practices. Therefore, there are many reasons why institutional investors could be sensitive to accuracy of analyst forecasts, including those cited in Bushee and Noe (2000) and O'Brien and Bhushan (1990) .
First, institutional investors could be attracted to companies with more accurate analyst earnings forecasts because they perceive such companies to be less risky. Institutional investors manage financial portfolios for their clients, are subject to a variety of legal restrictions on their activities, and should follow the "prudent person" standard in their investment choices (Cummins et al., 1980; Cummins and Westerfield, 1981; Badrinath et al., 1989; O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Gompers and Metrick, 2001) . Institutional portfolio managers are constantly evaluated and are motivated to present their choices as reasonable, well-informed, and discreet.
During times of inferior portfolio performance, "a 'safety-net' is provided to managers if they can demonstrate that their judgment regarding the soundness of a particular investment choice was shared by others" (Badrinath et al., 1989, p. 607) . Kasznik and McNichols (2002) suggest that the market perceives meeting analyst forecasts consistently as a signal of reduced investment risk. If this is true, institutional investors will find it easier to justify their investment in companies with more accurate earnings forecasts and to provide proof of care to their fiduciaries, should the need arise. Thus, institutional portfolio managers might perceive the accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts as a "safety-net attribute" (Badrinath et al., 1989) .
Second, institutional investors value analyst earnings forecasts accuracy if they see it as a factor that reduces the price impact of trades. Higher accuracy of analyst forecasts is a common outcome of better corporate disclosure practices. In addition, increased forecast accuracy is an objective, tangible outcome of those disclosure practices, as compared to perceptions of analysts about those practices. Prior research demonstrates that (1) institutions tend to invest in companies with a lower price impact (Falkenstein, 1996; Gompers and Metrick, 2001) and (2) greater disclosures reduce information asymmetry and decrease price impact (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991) .
Third, institutional investors might perceive the accuracy of analyst forecasts as an indicator of profitable trading opportunities. Kim and Verrecchia (1994) Overall, institutional investors' sensitivity to the accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts depends on their investment horizons and strategies. To capture these key parameters, we follow the methodology of Bushee (1998) (2009) demonstrate that analysts anticipate larger stock mispricing due to earnings management when accounting disclosure is more transparent and when the most important investor group is that of transient investors.
Building on both those insights (loss of information advantage and anticipation of mispricing), we expect the relationship between dedicated investors' ownership and earnings forecast accuracy to be opposite the relationship expected between transient investors' ownership and earnings forecast accuracy. Thus, our third hypothesis is:
H3: Ceteris paribus, the percentage of dedicated investors' ownership in a firm is negatively associated with the accuracy of the analysts' earnings forecasts for that firm.
The final group of institutional investors -quasi-indexers -is characterized by diversified portfolio and low portfolio turnover. This group represents institutions that do not conduct extensive research and follow the passive, "buy and hold" strategy, often investing in companies to follow the composition of certain indices. Contrary to transient investors, quasi-indexers do not benefit from the decreased price impact of trades for companies with more accurate earnings forecasts because their trades are infrequent. Contrary to dedicated investors, quasi-indexers do not lose a private information advantage due to better disclosures and generally welcome corporate disclosures as cost-effective monitoring device (Bushee and Noe, 2000) . Quasiindexers still might find companies with more accurate earnings forecasts more attractive if the increased accuracy signals decreased investment risk or improved corporate governance. On the other hand, if quasi-indexers, similar to dedicated investors, recognize the preference of transient investors for companies with more accurate earnings forecasts and associated mispricing, we would expect decreased investment by quasi-indexers in companies with more accurate earnings forecasts. It is also possible that quasi-indexers just strictly follow the composition of a certain index without any attention to the accuracy of the analyst earnings forecasts or other firm characteristics. Thus, we are unable to formulate a directional hypothesis about the sensitivity of quasi-indexers to accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts, and we simply speculate:
H4: There is no significant association between quasi-indexers' ownership in a firm and the accuracy of the analysts' earnings forecasts for that firm.
III. DATA.
Sample selection and calculation of institutional ownership.
The data for our empirical analysis is gathered from four sources. We obtain analyst forecast data from I/B/E/S and equity returns from CRSP. Compustat is our source for various measures of firm characteristics. Finally, our institutional holdings data is obtained from the Thomson Financial Institutional Holdings (13F) database. SEC Rule 13F requires that all institutions with more than $100 million of equity under management file a quarterly report that lists all equity holdings greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 in market value. For each firm in our sample, we calculate the total institutional holdings (IO) by adding up the shares owned by all institutions filing Form 13F for that firm. Following Bushee's (1998 Bushee's ( , 2001 ) classification, we further break down the total institutional holdings for each firm into holdings by transient investors (TRA), quasi-indexers (QIX), and dedicated investors (DED). TRA, QIX, and DED are scaled by the year-end shares outstanding, and reported as ownership percentages.
In our paper, we adopt the decomposition algorithm developed by Bushee (1998 Bushee ( , 2001 ).
First, the extent of portfolio diversification for each institution is measured by the level of portfolio concentration, average percentage holding, fraction of institutional block holdings (defined as owning more than 5% of all shares outstanding), and a Herfindahl measure using the squared percentage of ownership in each firm. Next, trading frequency is measured by portfolio turnover, and a stability measure based on the fraction of equity held for more than two years.
We then use these six measures in a principal component analysis to extract two common factors: block holdings (BLOCK) and portfolio turnover (PTURN). A low (high) BLOCK indicates a diversified (concentrated) investment position, while a low (high) PTURN indicates a low (high) trading frequency for the institution. Finally, cluster analysis is performed to obtain the final separation of firms into three groups: (1) the transient group (TRA) with high turnover and highly diversified positions; (2) the quasi-indexing group (QIX) with low turnover and high diversification; and (3) the dedicated group (DED) with low turnover and high concentration in their investment.
We limited the firms included in our final sample to those that meet a number of additional criteria. All firm-year observations are for December fiscal-year ends 1 1 Similar to Ackert and Athanassakos (2003) and Givoly (1985) we choose firms with identical fiscal year end (December year end) to ensure an appropriate comparison due to common forecast horizon. between 1986 and 2005. For each firm-year, the absolute value of earnings per share equals or exceeds $0.20, stockholders' equity is positive, and at least three individual analysts forecasted earnings per share for that firm-year. Financial-sector companies (SIC 6000-6999) are excluded from our data. Finally, any firm-years missing observations for any of our control variables were excluded from the sample. The final sample contains 12,872 observations for 2686 companies.
Independent and control variables.
We calculate forecast accuracy following Haw et al. (1994) as
, where it A is actual earnings per share (EPS) for firm i in year t reported in I/B/E/S summary tape and it F is the I/B/E/S analyst consensus EPS forecast issued during the first forecast period for firm i for year t. For our analysis, we use analysts' summary earnings forecasts issued for the current fiscal year during the first forecast period related to this fiscal year as identified on the I/B/E/S "Summary History Tape." Similar to Ackert and
Athanassakos (2003), we exclude observations with absolute values of annual actual earnings below 20 cents to avoid extreme forecast errors due to small deflators.
We include a variety of control variables in our model to capture previously documented determinants of institutional ownership. These variables are listed and described below.
Company size ( t i
Size , ) is proxied by the natural logarithm of the market value of firm i, measured at the end of fiscal year t. This variable captures the preference of institutional investors for larger companies (Cummins and Westerfield, 1981; Badrinath et al., 1989; Ackert and Athanassakos, 2001; Gompers and Metrick, 2001 ).
Stock illiquidity ( t i
Eliq , ) controls for institutional investors' inclination to invest in more liquid stocks (Falkenstein, 1996; Gompers and Metrick, 2001 Prior research reports an association between institutional ownership and stock volatility (Sias, 1996; Bushee and Noe, 2000) . While these studies suggest that increased stock volatility is the consequence of the presence of certain groups of investors, it is also feasible that some groups of institutional investors see high volatility as a signal of profitable trading opportunities and invest more heavily in those firms. To rule out this alternative explanation, we control for stock volatility in our model. is the common control variable for systematic (market-wide) investment risk (correlation of stock returns with market returns), calculated from a market model using daily stock returns over an annual period.
IRISK , is our control variable for idiosyncratic (nonsystematic) investment risk calculated from a market model. We calculate IRISK as the standard deviation of market model residuals 2 We also considered volatility of market adjusted returns, and the results are similar.
over an annual period. Prior research documents the positive association of institutional ownership with systematic risk (Badrinath et al., 1989; O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990 ) and the negative association of institutional ownership with idiosyncratic risk (Bushee, 2001 ).
We therefore include IRISK and BETA in our model following the logic of Bushee and Noe (2000) .
LEV , is our control variable for the capital structure of firm i, calculated as total liabilities divided by total equity at the end of the year t. Prior research reports that capital structure is associated with different categories of stock ownership (e.g., Chowdhury and Geringer, 2001; Li et al., 2009 ). This variable is also commonly used in empirical studies to capture various dimensions of firm risk (e.g., Badrinath et al., 1989; Bushee and Noe, 2000; Bushee, 2001 ).
We also include the following variables that capture other aspects of corporate performance that might be important for institutional investors trading decisions (Bushee, 1998; Gompers and Metrick, 1998; Bushee and Noe, 2001 ):
MRET , ) captures the stock price performance. Higher stock returns supposedly reflect superior management ability (Badrinath et al., 1989) , and prior research documents the positive association of this variable with higher ownership by at least some categories of institutional investors (Badrinath et al., 1989; O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Bushee and Noe, 2000) .
EP , is the earnings-price ratio. This ratio reflects two conflicting effects: risk and growth opportunities. Prior research documents the negative association of total institutional ownership with the earnings-price ratio (Ackert and Athanassakos, 2001) . This evidence suggests the dominance of the risk factor over the growth factor when institutional investors evaluate this investment signal.
Analyst following ( t i AN , ), measured as the number of analysts who issued earnings forecasts for firm i for year t, captures differences in information intensity for firm i. Prior research documents the preference of institutional investors toward more "visible" firms with more transparent information environments, due to their fiduciary responsibility and other factors (e.g., Falkenstein, 1996; Bushee and Noe, 2000) . Analyst following has been commonly used as a proxy for market visibility (e.g., Ackert and Athanassakos, 2001) and information availability (e.g., Bhushan, 1989; O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990) .
Prior research documents the positive association between this variable and institutional ownership (O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990) . Therefore, we include this variable in our model to rule out the explanation that accuracy of analyst forecasts is merely an indirect proxy for analyst following. Table 2 reports pair-wise Pearson correlation coefficients for our dependent, independent and control variables with p-values for a null hypothesis of zero correlation in parentheses. The correlations reported in Table 2 support inclusion of our independent variables as predictors in the model, as most of them are significantly correlated at least with one of our dependent variables.
We found two cases of relatively high correlation between independent variables, suggesting the presence of multicollinearity in our data. These are the correlation between esize (logarithm of market value) and AN (number of analysts whose estimates are included in the consensus forecast), which is equal to 0.73, and the correlation between idiosyncratic risk (irisk) and stock volatility (vol), which is equal to 0.79. However, those variables are control variables; they are not the focus of our investigation. Prior research strongly supports the inclusion of all those variables as relevant predictors of institutional ownership. Although the t-tests related to these variables might be distorted (Studenmund 1997, p.266), we prefer this result to the alternative of dropping relevant variables from the model. In subsequent analyses, variance inflation factors (VIF) and condition indexes (CI) confirmed that overall multicollinearity in the model does not exceed the moderate level, using the common rule of VIF < 10, CI < 30 (Kennedy 1992; Kutner, Nachtsheim, and Neter 2004).
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IV. MODEL AND LEVELS ANALYSIS
We also conducted sensitivity tests to ensure that exclusion of one of these control variables from the model does not significantly change our results.
Our data is pooled time-series and cross-sectional unbalanced panel data. Since institutional ownership data is likely to be correlated across firms and industries and over time, while coefficients on t Y measure differences in the particular year from the year 1986 base and coefficients on k I measure differences in the particular industry (defined based on one-digit SIC code) from the agriculture industry base, after taking into account the impacts of the described earlier control variables. Table 3 reports results from estimation of the model where the levels of each type of institutional ownership are regressed on the contemporaneous levels of the analyst forecast accuracy (12,872 observations for 2,686 firms). Table 4 
V. CHANGES ANALYSIS
In the prior section, we reported statistically significant associations between levels of certain types of institutional ownership and both contemporaneous and lagged levels of analyst earnings forecast errors. To test the robustness of these findings, similar to Bushee and Noe (2000) , we next test whether year-to-year changes in analyst earnings forecast accuracy lead to We follow the logic of Bushee and Noe (2000) , and first calculate the annual change in analyst forecast error as the difference between analyst forecast error in two adjacent years. We also control for the prior level of institutional ownership similar to Bushee and Noe (2000) . We 7 O'Brien and Bhushan (1990) point out that changes analysis provides a stronger test of potential causality than the levels analysis. It is common for the levels of many variables to be cross-sectionally correlated. While correlations in changes do not still prove causality, the lack of such correlations allows distinguishing between meaningful and spurious correlations in the "level variables" (p. 57). include an additional variable,
which is the quintile ranking of the specific type of institutional ownership in firm i in year t-1. 9 We use the prior year's level of liquidity, turnover, volatility, beta, and idiosyncratic risk because those changes are potentially endogeneous with changes in institutional ownership (Bushee and Noe 2000) .
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The evidence in table 5 suggests that transient investors sell stock when forecast error increases ( This finding is consistent with Bushee and Noe's (2000) evidence that quasi-indexers demonstrate quicker reactions to external signals in their selling decisions than in their buying decisions. However, Bushee and Noe (2000) interprettheir results as evidence that quasi-indexers are sensitive to disclosure quality only when this quality declines but not when it improves. Our findings are not consistent with such an interpretation. Our results suggest that quasi-indexers sell shares when the forecast error for that company decreases, a signal that is usually associated with improved disclosure quality. We suggest that the behavior of quasi-indexers should be understood within an investor sentiment framework. Quasi-indexers might perceive decreased forecast error as the signal of an arbitrage opportunity, given the strong preference by transient investors toward companies with more accurate earnings forecasts. Quasi-indexers might also be familiar with the evidence that analysts revise their future earnings forecasts upward for companies meeting current expectations (Kasznik and McNichols, 2002) ,and consistent with the "revert to the mean" phenomenon, anticipate a lower likelihood for the company to meet consequent earnings projections. The speculation about quasi-indexers' reliance on a "revert to the mean" heuristic is supported by our evidence that ownership by quasi-indexers is negatively associated with market-adjusted prior returns, suggesting that quasi-indexers are the first to sell prior market "winners." Alternatively, specifics of the performance evaluation of quasi-indexer portfolio managers might explain such a response (Lakonishok et al., 1991) .
The investment response of dedicated investors to the signal of changes in forecast accuracy, controlling for other relevant factors, differs from the reactions of transient investors and quasi-indexers to this signal. Evidence about dedicated investors suggests that they buy when forecast errors both increase ( 1 π =0.34184, p=0.0326) and decrease ( 2 π =0.61339, p=0.0038). This reaction to increased forecast errors is consistent with our hypothesis of a relative information advantage. Further, from the "investor sentiment" perspective, dedicated investors might recognize the earlier-reported slow reaction of quasi-indexers in their buy decisions as an additional arbitrage opportunity. That dedicated investors also buy when forecast errors decrease is puzzling, and presents an anomaly not explained by previous research. One possible explanation for this anomaly is that our research design did not control for the potential feedback effect of the presence of dedicated investors on the increase or decrease in analyst forecast error. We address such concerns in the next section of this paper. Overall, dedicated investors seem to approach changes in analyst forecast errors as market noise that potentially provide them with arbitrage opportunities.
VI. ENDOGENEITY OF INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND ANALYST FORECAST ACCURACY.
Our prior analyses suggest that the various groups of institutional investors respond differently to the signal of analyst earnings forecast accuracy. However, there is an alternative explanation for our reported associations. (Duru and Reeb, 2002; Brown, 2001) , and depreciation expense intensity measured as the ratio of depreciation expense to sales (Haw et al., 1994; Lev, 1983 ).
12 Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients for the systems of the simultaneous equations.
In parentheses we provide p-values of the null hypothesis that the specific coefficient is equal to zero (two-tailed test). Overall, we report evidence of a distinct relationship between stock 12 Some of the observations in our sample lacked the additional control variables from Compustat. Therefore, our sample for simultaneous equations modeling included 12,819 observations for 2,677 companies. 13 Since many variables affect institutional ownership but not forecast accuracy and vice versa, our model is "overidentified". Table 6 reports 3SLS estimates obtained through performing SAS Proc Syslin procedure with industry and year effects modeled as fixed effects (instrumental variables). Forecast accuracy and institutional ownership are endogeneous variables. All other control variables are exogenous (instrumental) variables. 3SLS is a system method which is asymptotically more efficient than single equation estimation methods but is more sensitive to specification error. Therefore, we also checked robustness of our findings with 2SLS estimates which is a single equation estimation method: the results were qualitatively similar. Similar to Wang and Zhang (2009) , we also ran "by year" estimates for the system of simultaneous equations that did not include fixed effects for year or industry. We then applied Fama-MacBeth procedure to obtain the time-series average of estimated coefficients (we got 20 unique set of estimates, one per each year) and to obtain the simple t-test that coefficients are different from zero.
ownership by various institutional groups and the accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts. After controlling for endogeneity between institutional ownership and forecast accuracy, we confirm the hypothesized preference of transient investors toward companies with lower forecast errors ( 1 π = -4.7388 with p <0.0001). In contrast, the association between dedicated investors and forecast accuracy is only marginally significant (p=0.08), and the association between quasiindexers and forecast accuracy is not significant at conventional levels, suggesting that forecast accuracy is less important in making investment choices to these two groups of institutional Our results with respect to our variables of interest were qualitatively identical. We believe it is more appropriate to model distinct years and industries as the fixed effects rather than to assume that our independent variables (e.g., size) will affect our dependent variables in a different manner depending on the particular year or industry.
Modeling of industry and year effects as fixed effects in simultaneous equations is also consistent with our prior modeling in equations 1-2. To check robustness of our results, we re-estimated our analyses excluding an insignificant variable of earnings per share from the first equation of the system and analyst following from both equations due to additional endogeneity concerns. Our results remained qualitatively the same. resulted in a model that explained roughly only 3 % of variance in levels of dedicated investors.
This finding highlights the uniqueness of the investment strategy of dedicated investors and warrants further investigation.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this study, we examine the association between analyst earnings forecast error and institutional ownership, measured separately for different groups of institutional investors (transient, dedicated, and quasi-indexers), using level model specifications, changes model specifications, and applying a simultaneous equations analysis. Consistent with our initial hypothesis, we report that transient investors are indeed drawn to companies with lower forecast errors and increase (decrease) their holdings when the forecast error decreases (increases).
However, the evidence on the behavior of dedicated investors and quasi-indexers reveals a more complex decision pattern.
After controlling for endogeneity, forecast error does not impact levels of ownership by quasi-indexers or dedicated investors. At the same time, our changes analyses suggest that quasiindexers decrease their holdings in response to forecast error decreases, while dedicated investors increase their holdings in response to both increases and decreases of forecast error.
We speculate that both dedicated investors and quasi-indexers recognize the attention of transient investors to forecast accuracy and perceive changes in forecast error as a signal of arbitrage opportunities. However, the reaction of dedicated investors and quasi-indexers to this signal is asymmetric; quasi-indexers more ready to sell, while dedicated investors more ready to buy. This possibly arises because the investment strategies and related performance evaluation of portfolio managers differs between dedicated investors and quasi-indexers. More research is warranted to explore the source of this phenomenon and the consequences of such behavior for stock price movements.
Surprisingly, we find that, after controlling for endogeneity, ownership by dedicated investors and quasi-indexers leads to increases in earnings forecast errors. This contradicts some prior studies that documented decreased information asymmetry when institutional ownership increased. However, our results are consistent with recent findings (e.g., Ajinkya et al., 2005; Wang and Zhang, 2009), and Porter (1992) argues that, in certain condition, institutions exercise their control over corporate management to achieve exclusive self-serving benefits and to suppress the information access of other capital providers. Overall, our empirical evidence confirms the heterogeneity of investment interests among transient investors, dedicated investors, and quasi-indexers, including differential attention to analyst earnings forecast accuracy. Therefore, we join prior researchers in their call to adjust for investors' heterogeneity in research models rather than to cast institutional investors as a homogeneous group. Our results complement the results of prior studies, and demonstrate that different types of institutional investors are often driven by opposite factors and have opposite impact on a variety of financial variables (e.g., Bushee and Noe, 2000; Wang and Zhang, 2009 ).
Therefore, treating institutional investors in the aggregate without decomposition will preclude uncovering any genuine links in such cases, and will likely result in erroneous implications. We highlight in particular the need for future studies to address the investment algorithms of dedicated investors, since previously-identified determinants of institutional ownership did not adequately explain the investment choices of dedicated investors.
While prior discussion articulates the relevance of our findings for accounting academics, our results also provide valuable insights for corporate management. Our findings suggest that transient investors are the only group of institutional investors who desire to invest in low forecast error firms. Thus, whether they are aware of it or not, in their attempts to achieve "predictable earnings" both management and analysts appeal mainly to transient institutional investors. Prior research documents the association of transient investment with stock volatility and other negative outcomes (e.g., Bushee and Noe, 2000) . Therefore, executives might consider the evidence from this study while conducting cost-benefit analysis and choosing among alternatives in their disclosure decisions. This table reports Pearson correlation coefficients with the p value for a test of the null hypothesis of zero correlation in parentheses. We provide the detailed description of all variables of the model on pp. 13-16 of our paper. This table reports the estimated coefficients for the systems of the simultaneous equations. The sample includes 12 819 observations for 2677 firms. In parentheses we report p-values of the null hypotheses that the coefficient is equal to zero (two-tailed test).
